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Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage:           
A Response to Calhoun 
SAMUEL C. RICKLESS* 
Cheshire Calhoun’s paper falls into three parts.1  In the first, she 
argues that paying “more careful attention to the historical practice of 
polygamy strengthens [rather than, as is often thought, weakens] the case 
for same-sex marriage.”2  In the second, she argues that “the state would 
do better to move toward [and advocates of same-sex marriage would do 
better to advocate] a more pluralistic conception of personal 
relationships.”3  She freely admits that such a pluralistic conception 
makes room for the legal recognition of polygamous marriages.4  But in 
the third section she argues that there is nothing inherently wrong with 
polygamy: in particular, as she puts it, “gender inequality is a 
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy.”5  The conclusion to 
be drawn from her discussion is that advocates of same-sex marriage 
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 1. Cheshire Calhoun, Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for 
Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of Polygamy, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1023 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 1037. 
 3. Id. (emphasis added). 
 4. See id. (recognizing that “[d]isestablishing a single state form of marriage 
would, of course, open the doors to state recognition of polygamous marriages”). 
 5. Id. at 1039. 




should happily bite Scalia’s bullet:6 if we legalize same-sex marriage, 
then (by the same token) we should legalize polygamy. 
In this Comment, I would like to raise some objections to each of the 
three main sections of Calhoun’s paper.  I do not think of these 
objections as fatal to Calhoun’s project, but I do think that they represent 
difficulties that need to be addressed if I am to be brought to agree with 
her main claims. 
Let us begin with Calhoun’s claim that attention to the historical 
practice of polygamy strengthens, rather than weakens, the case for 
same-sex marriage.7  As Calhoun points out, opponents of legalization 
often argue, on traditionalist grounds, (1) that legalization should follow 
core social values, (2) that core social values are determined by the 
Judeo-Christian tradition, and (3) that this tradition is overwhelmingly 
hostile to recognition of same-sex marriage.8  Although Calhoun recognizes 
that it is possible to challenge this argument by denying that legalization 
should follow core social values (or, for that matter, that these values are 
determined by religious tradition),9 she claims that the Judeo-Christian 
tradition is not nearly as hostile to same-sex marriage as traditionalists 
believe.10  Calhoun bases this claim on the following evidence: the Old 
Testament patriarchs engaged in polygamy; the Bible never speaks 
against polygamy; some European Jews practiced polygamy until the 
eleventh century, and only banned it under duress; Martin Luther argued 
that Christianity does not proscribe polygamy; and The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints recognized (and, in fact, encouraged) 
polygamous marriage until 1890, and only banned it under duress.11  
Accordingly, Calhoun concludes that “polygamous marriage cannot be 
dismissed as a negligible blip in an otherwise consistent tradition of 
heterosexual monogamous marriage.”12
In response to this, it might be argued (reasonably, it seems to me) 
that, even if the practice of polygamy is not a “negligible blip,” it has 
certainly not achieved (and would not have achieved, even in the 
absence of governmental pressure) the status of anything approaching 
 6. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“If . . . the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state 
interest, [criminal laws against bigamy cannot] survive rational-basis review.”). 
 7. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1037. 
 8. Id. at 1027–30. 
 9. See id. at 1027 (pointing out that “[o]ne way of challenging the traditionalist’s 
argument is to challenge the propriety of premising our laws on the majority’s moral or 
religious values . . . .”). 
 10. See id. at 1028 (noting “there has been at least a minor thread within the 
Judeo-Christian tradition of acknowledging same-sex unions”). 
 11. Id. at 1028–29. 
 12. Id. at 1029. 
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monogamy in cultural significance.  For one thing, the mainline 
Christian and Jewish denominations have been uniformly hostile to 
polygamy for centuries.  For another, polygamous sects (such as the 
Mormons) are clearly offshoots (and would have remained so even in 
the absence of governmental interference).  Every religious denomination 
has its offshoots and dissenters.  What the traditionalist will say, I think, 
is that core social values are determined by the overwhelming majority, 
rather than a very small minority. 
In support of her second claim, which is that the state and proponents 
of same-sex marriage would do better to support a pluralistic conception 
of marriage,13 Calhoun says this: there are two ways to look at civil 
marriage.  On the one hand, one can think of civil marriage as a private 
contract entered into only by voluntary consent.14  On the other, one can 
think of civil marriage as a public status, like citizenship, the nature of 
which is appropriately determined by the state according to its 
conception of what conduces to the general welfare.15  Calhoun argues 
that these two conceptions of civil marriage “pull against each other”:16 
the principle that persons should be free to enter into binding contracts 
as long as this does not violate the rights of others pushes in the 
direction of hymeneal pluralism;17 but the principle that only civil 
marriages that conduce to the public good should be recognized pushes 
in the direction of hymeneal monism.18  Calhoun then argues that, of 
these two principles, the state should adopt the first (pluralistic) 
principle, rather than the second (monistic) principle.19  For, as she puts 
it, “maintaining a single state definition of marriage is at odds with the 
fundamental premises of a liberal political society, with the private, 
contractual aspect of marriage, and with satisfying individuals’ multiple 
relational needs.”20
In response, I want to take issue with the dichotomy that forms the 
basis of Calhoun’s argument for hymeneal pluralism.  Even within a 
liberal political society, there is nothing sacrosanct about private 
contracts per se.  Bars to contract enforcement include the risk of danger 
 13. Id. at 1037.   
 14. Id. at 1033. 
 15. Id. at 1034. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 1034. 
 19. Id. at 1037. 
 20. Id.  




to oneself or others as a result of ignorance or irrationality.  Some 
contracts are simply void ab initio.  The liberal state’s role is not merely 
to enforce, but also to regulate private contracts in order to protect the 
contracting parties against their own ignorance and irrationality.  (For 
example, it would be well within the purview of the liberal state to 
declare contracts into slavery or indentured servitude null and void.)  Of 
course, this is not to say that liberal paternalism knows no bounds: there 
are limits to what a liberal state may do in the name of protecting the 
parties to private contracts.  But it remains true that the regulative model 
of the state vis-à-vis private contracts differs from, and offers us 
something of a middle way between, both of the models Calhoun offers: 
on the one hand, perfect freedom of contract, and on the other, state 
definition of marriage for the public good. 
I would argue further that the regulative model makes it possible to 
explain, in a principled way consistent with good old-fashioned liberalism, 
how one might coherently support the legalization of same-sex marriage 
without thereby being committed to supporting the legalization of 
polygamy.  The relevant issue is whether there are sufficiently weighty 
paternalistic reasons to ban polygamy (or certain forms of polygamy), 
without there being sufficiently weighty paternalistic reasons to ban 
same-sex marriage.  Arguably, there are.  At least as currently practiced in 
the United States, polygamy takes the form of polygyny (one husband, 
many wives) rather than polyandry (one wife, many husbands).21  The 
most common polygynous relationships, at their inception, involve a 
much older husband and a very young wife (usually still in her teens).22  
At least within the offshoots of Mormonism that look kindly on 
polygyny, the wife-to-be has been raised to believe that it is her religious 
duty to enter such a marriage and then bear as many children as 
possible.23  These circumstances suggest that polygamy survives only on 
 21. See D. Michael Quinn, Plural Marriage and Mormon Fundamentalism, in 
FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY: RECLAIMING THE SCIENCES, THE FAMILY, AND 
EDUCATION 240 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds., 1993) (“[Mormon 
fundamentalists believe] that God sanctions and commands that righteous men of a 
divine latter-day Covenant marry more than one wife.”). 
 22. Id. at 259 (“But plural wives are often teenagers and sometimes twenty years 
younger than their polygamous husbands.”).  As this Comment goes to press, the New 
York Times reports that the head of the polygynous Fundamental Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, Warren Jeffs, who is reported to have 60 or 70 wives, “is a fugitive, 
indicted [in June 2005] on sexual abuse charges that he forced a 16-year-old girl to 
marry a 28-year-old married man.  Opponents of Mr. Jeffs say he ordered hundreds of 
such unions, often between girls barely in their teens and men decades older.” Nick 
Madigan, After Fleeing Polygamist Community, an Opportunity for Influence, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 2005, at A1. 
 23. According to Mormon theology, the spirit-children of gods wait to be born as 
humans.  Since a spirit-child cannot become a god without his faith’s having been tested 
as a human being, unborn spirit-children cannot reach the state of divine exaltation.  
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the backs of young girls who have been brainwashed into submitting to a 
practice to which they would not otherwise freely consent.  Even if 
Calhoun were right that the state has no business regulating polygamous 
marriages freely entered into by knowledgeable and rational adults, the 
practical consequences of banning the particular kinds of polygyny just 
discussed would be no different from the practical consequences of 
banning polygamy altogether. 
Still, as Calhoun might argue, the regulative model by itself does not 
speak against polygamous marriages generally, but only against 
particular kinds of polygamous marriages (polygynous marriages in 
which the wives-to-be are cognitively or emotionally immature).  This 
brings us to Calhoun’s third point, which is that there is nothing 
inherently wrong with polygamy: if polygamy conduces to gender 
inequality, it does so only contingently.24  At least in principle, it might 
be possible for some polygamous marriages to survive the state’s 
paternalistic interest in protecting the contracting parties. 
In reply, I want to suggest that there are reasons to believe that 
polygamy is essentially problematic and unstable.  A marriage is a 
committed relationship designed to facilitate the rearing of children and 
the fulfillment of deep emotional needs, including most notably sexual 
and other personal forms of intimacy.  Suppose now that we have a 
polyandrous marriage in which Carol is married to both Bob and Ted.  
Even if Bob and Ted enter such a marriage with their eyes open, reason 
and experience suggest that neither husband should have any confidence 
that his relationship with Carol will be able to survive Carol’s 
relationship with another husband.  Imagine the possibilities.  Suppose 
Bob and Carol are childless, while Ted and Carol have four children.  Or 
suppose Bob stays fit while Ted, whether culpably or nonculpably, 
contracts a serious illness.  Or suppose Bob has a well-paying job, but 
Ted is unemployed.  Even if Carol is scrupulously fair, it stands to 
reason that Ted’s problems or responsibilities under these sorts of 
circumstances will place enormous emotional pressure on Bob.  If Ted is 
caring for four children, or Ted is seriously ill, or Ted is depressed 
Thus, the more children a human woman begets, the more spirit-children are given the 
chance of achieving exaltation.  See JAMES H. SNOWDEN, THE TRUTH ABOUT MORMONISM 
141 (1926) (“[The glory of Mormon men] is in proportion to the number of their wives 
and children.”). 
 24. See Calhoun, supra note 1, at 1039 (stating that “gender inequality is a 
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy”). 




because he cannot find a job, then Carol will naturally feel the need to 
spend more time with Ted and correspondingly less time with Bob.  
Under these circumstances, it is natural for Bob to feel shortchanged, 
especially if he thinks that Ted is in any way responsible for the relevant 
circumstances.  Even under ideal circumstances, each husband’s need 
for emotional intimacy conduces to competition for Carol’s attention.  
The fact is that all marriages face crises and that many monogamous 
partners fail to manage these crises effectively.  By reason of their very 
structure, polygamous marriages are even less likely to withstand such 
pressure over the long term.25  One result of this is that the children of 
such marriages are likely to suffer because their emotional needs are not 
fulfilled, whether or not the marriage survives. 
Now it seems to me that, on the regulative model, the state, exercising 
legitimate paternalistic powers, ought to be able to ban marriages that 
are structurally problematic in this way.  Notice that same-sex 
marriage per se does not suffer from this kind of structural infirmity.  
Nor, for that matter, do marriages that take the form of ménages-a-trois, or 
ménages-a-quatre, and so on—marriages in which (in some sense) each 
of the spouses is “married” to each of the other spouses.  Structural 
problems arise only in the context of the sort of asymmetrical 
relationship definitive of polygamous marriage. 
Ultimately, then, I do not believe that Calhoun has provided sufficiently 
compelling reasons to bite Scalia’s bullet.26  And given the rest of the 
bullets in Scalia’s arsenal of slippery slope arguments, this may be a 
good thing, too. 
 
 25. See D. Michael Quinn, supra note 21, at 261.  D. Michael Quinn also reports 
that “jealousy can be corrosive even for the most devoted fundamentalist families.” Id. 
 26. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
